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Introduction	
	
Home	equity	levels	play	a	key	role	in	the	economic	experiences	of	countries.	The	
example	of	the	U.S.	situation	is	very	informative.	In	2005,	the	home	equity	level	
stood	at	$14.4	 trillion.	U.S.	 government	expenditure	 in	 the	 same	year	was	$4.4	
trillion.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 Great	 Recession,	 the	 combined	 home	 equity	
levels	dropped	to	$8.2	 trillion	by	Q1	2012.	This	was	a	not	 inconsequential	 loss	
for	many	homeowners.	By	Q3	2020	the	level	of	home	equity	had	risen	to	$20.4	
trillion.	The	total	U.S.	home	value	level	rose	to	$31.2	trillion	by	Q3	2020.	One	may	
compare	this	to	2020	GDP	of		$20.924	trillion	and	more	importantly	to	the	share	
of	GDP	that	flowed	to	the	U.S.	government	(Federal,	State	and	Local)	in	2020	of	
an	estimated	amount	of	$	7.63	trillion.	In	2020,	the	total	home	values	in	the	U.S.	
were	just	more	than	4	times	the	combined	income	level	of	the	U.S.	Federal,	State	
and	Local	governments!	Even	taking	away	the	outstanding	housing	debt	level	of	
$10.2	 trillion,	 the	$20.9	 trillion	home	equity	 level	 still	 represents	 a	multiple	of	
2.74	times	of	the	combined	U.S.	government	tax	level	in	2020.	
	
There	are	at	least	three	methods	to	stimulate	an	economy:		
	
1.	Monetary	policy	is	executed	by	lowering	the	short-term	interest	rates	so	that	
savers	 are	 encouraged	 to	 spend	 more	 and	 borrowers	 can	 afford	 to	 borrow	
slightly	more	than	at	a	higher	interest	rate	level.		
	
2.	Fiscal	policy	works	in	that	a	government	can	borrow	more	in	order	to	spend	
above	its	tax	income	level.	This	implies	that	a	debt	is	created	that	in	future	years	
need	to	be	paid	back	by	all	households.		
	
3.	There	 is	a	potential	 third	option:	 the	Home	Equity	Policy.	A	government	can	
encourage	 home	 equity	 to	 be	 used	 on	 a	 temporary	 basis	 to	 stimulate	 the	
economy.	 “Re-savings”	 can	be	made	out	of	 future	 income	 levels.	The	beauty	of	
this	 system	 is	 that	 it	 is	 an	 individual	 household’s	 decision	 and	 the	 benefits	 of	
more	spending	go	directly	to	the	household	that	participates	in	the	scheme.	The	
replenishment	 of	 the	 home	 equity	 savings	 level	 is	 totally	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	
individual	household.		
	
The	 aim	 of	 all	 three	 methods	 is	 the	 same:	 increase	 demand	 levels	 and	 lower	
unemployment	 levels	 without	 accelerating	 inflation	 levels.	 Why	 method	 three	
might	prove	to	be	the	most	effective	is	explained	in	this	paper.	
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1.	The	Great	Recession	period	
	
	
An	 analysis	 of	 the	 Great	 Recession	 period	 may	 lead	 to	 some	 interesting	
conclusions.		
		
As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 lending	 pattern	 of	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 sector,	 especially	
related	 to	 home	 mortgages,	 the	 liquidity	 levels	 in	 mortgage-backed	 securities	
came	 to	 a	 grinding	 halt	 in	 2007.	 Subprime	 mortgages	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	
Achilles’	 heel	 of	 the	 U.S.	 financial	 sector.	 Some	 major	 banks	 and	 insurance	
companies	got	into	trouble	and	the	U.S	government	rescued	most	of	them.	
	
One	aspect	of	these	events	is	that	one	may	wonder	who	was	responsible	for	the	
households’	loss	of	$6.2	trillion	in	lost	home	equity	values	between	2007	and	Q1	
2012	and	thereby	created	one	of	the	most	severe	recessions	in	U.S.	history.	
	
The	first	aspect	is	to	study	the	total	U.S.	government	debt	level.	In	2007	a	level	of	
$	9.007	trillion	was	recorded,1	and	by	September	30	2012	the	debt	had	grown	to	
$16.738	trillion;	an	increase	of	$7.731	trillion	over	this	period.	The	fiscal	policy	
expansion	 to	 compensate	 for	 lower	 economic	 growth	 levels	 was	 certainly	
followed.	
	
The	second	one	is	the	Fed	Funds	rate	developments	over	the	period	2007-2012.2	
A	rate	of	5.31%	was	fixed	on	June	25	2007.	A	rapid	reduction	between	2007	and	
2012	 was	 made	 and	 on	 March	 5,	 2012	 the	 rate	 was	 lowered	 to	 0.12%.	 	 The	
(short-term)	interest	rate	policy	followed	the	developments	of	the	slowing	down	
economic	growth	path	over	this	period.	In	2008,	the	Federal	Reserve	started	its	
Quantitative	 Easing	 	 (QE)	 Program3	with	 has	 as	 one	 of	 its	 objectives	 to	 lower	
longer-term	 interest	 rates.	One	may	conclude	 that	 the	monetary	policies	of	 the	
Federal	Reserve	were	very	accommodating,	both	for	the	interest	rate	picture	and	
for	the	funding	of	U.S.	government	debt	levels.	
	
However,	the	effects	of	both	monetary	and	fiscal	policies	were	unable	to	quickly	
overcome	 the	 deterioration	 in	 the	 financial	 position	 of	 many	 U.S.	 households.	
This	position	had	deteriorated	by	$6.2	trillion	in	home	equity	values	and	by	an	
increase	 in	 unemployment	 levels	 from	 7.116	 million	 unemployed	 by	 January	
2007	to	15.352	million	unemployed	by	October	2009.4	
																																																								
1	
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo5.htm	
2	https://www.macrotrends.net/2015/fed-funds-rate-historical-chart	
3	https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/quantitative-easing-and-the-
quotnew-normalquot-in-monetary-policy.htm	
4	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNEMPLOY/	
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1.1	 Why	 the	 policies	 applied	 were	 slow	 in	 addressing	 the	 households’	
economic	and	financial	crisis.	
	
The	deterioration	in	the	individual	households	finances	began	in	2007,	when	the	
home	mortgage	market	was	 turned	around	 from	an	excessive	 lending	program	
by	the	U.S.	banking	sector	to	a	very	restrictive	one	with	a	lot	of	pressure	exerted	
to	get	households	to	pay	up.	When	many	households	could	not	keep	up	with	the	
demands	 from	 the	 banking	 sector	 -after	 the	 same	 banking	 sector	 had	 earlier	
enticed	these	households	to	borrow	excessively	for	house	purchases	during	the	
period	2004-2007,	 the	reverse	process	began.	 	The	banking	sector’s	aim	is	and	
was	to	reduce	their	doubtful	debtor	levels.	The	sector	tried	to	reclaim	as	much	as	
possible	from	the	outstanding	mortgage	portfolio.	Loss	limitation	was	very	much	
every	bank’s	or	other	financial	institution’s	aim.		
	
Between	 2007	 and	 2013	 21.228	 million	 households	 were	 confronted	 with	
Foreclosure	Filings	and	5.5	million	homes	were	repossessed.		
	
One	may	compare	this	to	the	new	housing	starts	in	the	U.S.	In	January	2006,	the	
new	housing	starts	levels	were	at	a	top	of	2.273	million	new	homes	on	an	annual	
basis.	In	April	2009	this	level	had	dropped	to	478	thousand,	again	on	an	annual	
basis.	The	next	highest	 level	was	reached	 in	December	2020.	The	new	housing	
starts	were	1.680	million	on	an	annual	basis.		
	
Another	 measurement	 is	 through	 average	 U.S.	 house	 prices5:	 the	 Case-Shiller	
index.	In	June	2006,	the	national	housing	price	index	was	184.6	and	by	February	
2012	it	had	dropped	to	133.99.	Only	by	January	2017	did	it	reach	the	June	2006	
level	again.	
	
The	repossession	process	caused	a	sharp	drop	in	new	housing	starts,	with	house	
prices	 dropping	 and	 new	 housing	 starts	 rapidly	 slowing	 down.	 Also,	 the	 slow	
down	in	building	activities	had	a	sizeable	 impact	on	employment	 levels	and	on	
construction	related	economic	activities.	During	the	same	period,	unemployment	
levels	more	 than	 doubled	 between	 January	 2007	 and	October	 2009.	 It	 took	 to	
April	 2017	 before	 the	 number	 of	 unemployed	 reached	 the	 same	 level	 as	 in	
January	2007	(7.196	million).	Just	as	an	additional	figure:	the	January	2021	level	
of	unemployment	stood	at	10.130	million	individuals	unemployed.	
	
	
																																																																																																																																																														
	
	
	
	
5S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index [CSUSHPINSA], 
retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA, February 25, 2021 
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1.2	The	uneven	adjustment	process	
		
The	usual	definition	of	economic	growth	is	that	a	recession	period	is	over	when	
two	consecutive	quarters	of	economic	growth	have	occurred.	A	better	definition	
could	be	that	such	recession	period	is	over	when	households	divided	by	groups	
show	a	positive	improvement	in	their	employment	and	net	wealth	position.	The	
Federal	Reserve	has	excellent	statistics	on	both	subjects6	7.	From	these	statistics	
one	may	observe	that	for	the	top	10%	of	households	by	wealth	level,	this	group	
took	 from	Q1	2007	when	 their	wealth	 level	 stood	 at	 $43.9	 trillion	 to	Q1	2012	
when	 it	 exceeded	 this	 level	 for	 the	 first	 time	at	$45.38	 trillion.	For	 the	 top	50-
90%	group	it	took	six	months	longer	to	Q3	2012	when	their	level	reached	$20.88	
trillion,	just	above	the	$20.81	trillion	of	Q1	2007.		However	for	the	bottom	50%	
of	households	 it	 took	more	 than	 five	years	 longer.	 In	Q1	2007,	 their	net	worth	
was	 	$1.41	 trillion	and	only	by	Q4	2017	did	 this	group	reach	 the	same	 level	of	
$1.41	trillion	again.	
	
Of	 course,	 in	 theory,	 can	 one	 declare	 a	 recession	 to	 be	 over	 when	 two	
consecutive	 quarters	 of	 economic	 growth	 have	 passed.	 As	 the	 above	 data	
showed,	was	it	not	premature	to	do	so	when	50%	of	all	U.S.	households	were	still	
in	a	loss	position?			Three	factors	played	a	key	role:		
	
1.	The	 first	 factor	was	 linked	to	employment	and	unemployment	 levels.	 In	May	
2007	the	number	of	unemployed	was	6.766	million	persons.	Only	by	November	
2017	was	this	“low’	 level	of	unemployment	reached	again	when	the	number	of	
unemployed	became	6.759	million.		
	
2.	The	U.S.	national	Case-Shiller	house	price	index	was	184.609	in	July	2006	and	
it	only	reached	this	level	again	by	January	2017,	when	it	measured	184.717	
	
3.	It	would	have	been	more	logical	to	accept	that	the	recession	period	did	finish,	
when,	 in	 2017,	 the	 50%	 of	 the	 collective	 households	 got	 back	 to	 the	 same	
unemployment	levels	as	in	2006	and	they	also	got	their	net	worth	back	up	to	the	
same	level	as	in	2006.		
	
In	my	 view,	 households’	 losses	 –both	 in	 income	 levels	 through	 unemployment	
and	in	wealth	levels	through,	among	others,	lower	house	prices-	becomes	only	an	
event	of	the	past	when	the	data	show	that	the	 loss	has	been	overcome.	For	the	
bottom	50%	of	U.S.	households	this	was	by	Q4	2017	for	employment	levels	and	
by	Q1	2017	for	wealth	levels.	
	
	
																																																								
6  https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/table/#
ra 
7	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE/	
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Perhaps	 economic	 growth	 levels	 on	 their	 own	 do	 not	 really	 reflect	
unemployment	 levels,	 losses	 in	 wealth	 or	 future	 losses	 on	 income.	 The	 latter	
occur	when	 a	 government	 first	 borrows	 and	 spends	more	 than	 its	 tax	 income.		
Subsequently,	the	U.S.	government	at	one	stage	will	have	to	increase	its	tax	levels	
and	thereby	reduces	the	net	income	levels	of	the	private	sector.	
	
	
2.	A	Federal	Reserve	sponsored	Home	Equity	Release	and	Resave	Method.	
	
In the U.S. the possibility to obtain a reverse mortgage exists. How this system works 
is explained in a document from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission8. Such reverse 
mortgages are generally expensive as they are based on commercial interest rates 
terms.	
	
This	 FTC	 system	 is	 not	 linked	 to	 economic	 developments	 and	 to	 reverse	 a	
reverse	 mortgage	 action	 would	 set	 a	 household	 back	 by	 a	 considerable	
percentage	 of	 the	 original	 amount	 obtained.	 In	 some	 cases	 reverse	mortgages	
carry	a	government	guarantee	for	the	amount	obtained.	
	
The	experience	from	the	Great	Recession	did	show	that	a	vital	difference	existed	
between	different	groups	of	households	in	recovering	their	jobs	and	their	wealth	
levels.	The	top	10%	of	wealth	holders	recovered	fastest,	quickly	followed	by	the	
40%	 second	 richest	 group	 of	 households.	 However,	 the	 bottom	 50%	 of	
households	took	over	10	years	to	get	back	to	the	same	levels	of	unemployment	
as	 in	 2007	 as	well	 as	 to	 “resave”	 up	 to	 their	 original	wealth	 level	 as	 it	was	 in	
2007.	
	
One	may	start	with	whatever	was	done.	The	U.S.	government	had	a	debt	level	of	
$8.849	trillion	in	Q1	2007.	By	Q1	2017	this	debt	had	grown	to	$19.846	trillion,	
an	increase	of	$11	trillion	over	these	years.	In	2017	its	tax	income	(Federal,	State	
and	 Local)	 was	 about	 $7.1	 trillion.	 Its	 debt	 to	 income	 level	 had	 grown	 to	 2.8	
times	its	income.	The	corona	virus	crisis	has	worsened	this	position	even	more.	
The	latest	U.S.	government	debt	level	is	just	over	$28	trillion	with	a	GDP	level	of	
$20.93	trillion	and	a			fiscal	income	level	of	$6.7	trillion.	
	
Since	the	Federal	Reserve	adopted	Quantitative	Easing	as	a	strategy	in	2008,	the	
amounts	involved	have	grown	dramatically.	According	to	its	latest	balance	sheet,	
over	the	years,	it	has	purchased	about	$6.5	trillion	in	U.S.	Government	Treasury	
Bonds	and	other	related	bonds.	 It	also	has	maintained	 its	 interest	rates	at	very	
low	levels.	
	
	
																																																																																																																																																																							
																																																								
8	https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0192-reverse-mortgages	
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2.1	Home	equity	savings	
	
There	 is	 one	 aspect	 of	 the	U.S.	 economy	 that	 has	 not	 gotten	 enough	 attention.	
This	 aspect	 involves	 the	 home	 equity	 savings	made	 by	many	 U.S.	 households.	
These	 are	 true	 savings	built	 up	often	over	many	years	 and	 such	 savings	 really	
represent	a	net	worth	for	a	household.		
	
The	 character	 of	 the	 monthly	 mortgage	 payments,	 usually	 to	 a	 financial	
institution,	 represents	 both	 a	 debt	 and	 a	 home	 equity	 element.	 Gradually	 over	
the	years,	the	debt	level	reduces	and	the	equity	element	grows.	The	home	equity	
element	 represents	 the	 own	 equity	 a	 homeowner	 has	 in	 his/her	 property.	 For	
the	 time	being,	 the	equity	element	 is	highly	 illiquid.	 It	 is	a	savings	amount	and	
should	be	considered	as	such.	However,	 it	 can	–as	yet-	not	easily	be	converted	
into	actual	 cash	without	encountering	punishing	 interest	 rates.	There	exists	no	
“monetization	method”	yet	to	give	households	some	of	their	home	equity	savings	
in	cash	on	a	temporary	basis.	The	only	method	is	the	FTC’s	one,	which	is	funded	
by	private	sources.	Such	sources	have	 two	drawbacks:	 firstly	 the	organizations	
involved	need	 to	borrow	 the	 funds	 they	 lend	 to	households	 and	 secondly	 they	
aim	to	make	a	profit	out	of	such	transactions.	
	
2.2	Why	use	home	equity	savings?	
	
There	are	several	reasons	to	use	home	equity	to	stimulate	demand	levels	 in	an	
economy.	
	
The	first	one	is	that	there	is	an	age	gap	between	older	and	younger	households	
resulting	in	often	a	higher	or	lower	level	of	home	equity.		Older	households	have	
had	more	 time	 to	 save	 up	 home	 equity,	 especially	 households	 that	 are	 in	 the	
bottom	70%	of	households	by	income	levels.	In	any	recession	period	many	of	the	
younger	 generation	 are	 more	 exposed	 to	 repossessions	 than	 the	 older	
generation.	
	
The	second	one	 is	 linked	to	being	employed	or	unemployed.	Households	 in	the	
top	50%	of	wealth	usually	can	survive	for	a	longer	period	of	time	with	the	help	of	
their	savings.	They	collectively	managed	$	64.8	trillion	in	assets,	compared	to	the	
bottom	50%	who	had	$1.41	trillion	in	assets	at	the	start	of	the	Great	Recession.	
	
The	third	reason	is	that	if	the	U.S.	can	set	up	and	manage	a	temporary	access	to	
home	equity	at	no	cost	to	the	holder	(QEHE),	then	for	each	U.S.	dollar	provided	
under	 such	 scheme,	 it	will	 need	 a	 dollar	 less	 in	 government	 debt	 increases.	 In	
other	words	such	scheme	works	best	when	government	debt	 is	already	at	high	
levels.	Not	only	 that,	 job	creation	will	be	accelerated,	which	 in	 itself	shortens	a	
recession	period,	 especially	 for	 the	bottom	50%	of	households	who	more	 than	
the	others	depend	on	an	employment	income.	QEHE	will	also	dampen	the		
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downward	 spiral	 of	 house	 prices,	 which	 has	 affected	 the	 bottom	 50%	 of	
households	 the	most;	both	 in	ownership	and	 in	rent	 levels.	A	 further,	probably	
unintended,	consequence	of	this	system	is	that	it	will	help	the	banking	sector	in	
having	to	make	lower	provisions	for	doubtful	debtors.	
	
	
	
3.	How	to	set	up	such	a	system	of	Quantitative	Easing	Home	Equity	(QEHE)	
	
There are a number of potential rules that could be applied. They are: 
 
1. The request for such conversion might have to come from an owner-occupier in a 
home. It is a freedom of choice method. Such requests can be made at the main bank 
of the potential participant and subsequently forwarded to a unit of the Federal 
Reserve for approval. 
 
2. Requests can also originate from homeowners who rent out properties. However 
there need to be limits regarding such equity conversion. It is probably wise to limit 
such cash withdrawal to less than 30% of the net equity position in a home. 
 
3. For homeowners-occupiers the request might not be approved if it lowers the 
equity level in a home to less than 10% of its value. Any value below 10% might 
encourage households to walk away from their obligations under the agreement with 
the Fed. Any value above 10% can potentially be considered, but the combined 
households collective requests have to fall in line with the government’s assessed 
need for economic stimulus. Any home value assessment should be based on 
February 2020 data. Any later date would not reflect normal supply and demand 
levels as house prices might have been “affected” by the occurrence of the 
coronavirus; a non economical influence.  
 
4. Many young persons and low-income earners face the greatest hardship as a 
consequence of the coronavirus. Parents’ help should be encouraged as the latter have 
had the longest time period to build up their home equity level. Zero tax on such 
transfers between generations would be an obvious method.  
 
5. The person or family withdrawing the equity from their home will also be 
responsible for “re-saving” the amount withdrawn. A contract between the Fed and 
the individual household will stipulate such obligation.  
 
6. To enable households to re-save in line with the economic situation, a grace period 
for such re-saving needs to be set. The Federal Reserve may also decide to make 
QEHE funds available at 0% interest rate for the homeowner as the home equity 
conversion is done in the national macro-economic interest.  
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8. If, like in many cases, the household still has a mortgage to service, it is suggested 
that the re-saving gets priority, so as to strengthen the equity base in the home again. 
It would imply that mortgage lenders (about 50% are funded by state sponsored 
enterprises anyway) could be temporarily paid the interest margin on the mortgage 
loan only. The principal amount of re-saving could be started when the economy has 
reached its desirable growth level again. 
 
9. Linking the re-saving level with the income and growth level implies that the re-
saving will be done at a slower pace, when the economy is still in a recession period. 
Only when the U.S economy is booming, will the speed of re-saving be accelerated 
until the full amount of home equity that was provided has been replaced. At that 
moment the outstanding mortgage facility is reinstated to the agreed interest plus 
principal payment facility.  
 
10. The U.S. government might need to determine the eligibility of households to 
participate in the QEHE System. Should the maximum income level eligible for the 
QEHE System be set at the median income level of $65,000 or at twice this amount at 
$130,000? Should there be regional variations?  
 
11.The U.S. government may also need to decide to what extent it wants the QEHE 
system to contribute to the U.S. economy; in other words how large a share of home 
equity is required to help improve the current situation. If enough money is converted 
into demand levels, the facility may be closed to newcomers until a new economic 
crisis occurs. One has to watch closely to what extend homeowners convert the 
savings cash received into other savings types. The purpose of the QEHE facility is to 
increase consumption; not to invest in the stock markets or in additional pension pots.  
 
12. The QEHE system allows the U.S. Fed to turn the tap off when releasing home 
equity is no longer needed and turn the tap back on when it judges the economic 
circumstances are appropriate. Such tap management is an important mechanism for 
managing inflation levels. In case the amounts provided cannot be absorbed by the 
commercial sector without causing undue inflationary pressures, then the Fed could 
accept household’s applications, but manage the pay-outs in line with the propensity 
of the commercial sector to absorb the increased demand.  
 
13. The QEHE account could be an account set up by the household’s principal bank 
on the request of the homeowner. The costs of maintaining such accounts – over 
which the banking system does not run a credit risk only an operational one- could be 
at the costs of the Government given that the scheme is in the macroeconomic 
national interest.  
 
14. Some homeowners might abuse the QEHE account. Therefore, if a homeowner 
does not fulfil his or hers contractual obligations in “re-saving” the principal amount 
when  
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due, he or she may be penalized by turning the facility into an ordinary mortgage with 
penalty interest rates. 	
 
15. In line with previous arrangements, the U.S. Government could give a guarantee 
to the Fed for potential losses made on the scheme for 10% of the outstanding 
amount.  
 
16. In order to implement the above, the U.S. Congress may have to draft a new law 
that gives the powers to the Federal Reserve to start a QEHE program.  
 
17. The QEHE system allows the economy to be managed by region, by inflation 
level, and by the state of the economy. It represents economic growth for all, but 
especially for the bottom 50%. The only additional action needed might be to regulate 
that households cannot use the funds to speculate on the stock markets, as this means 
moving funds from one savings category into another.  
	
	
4.	Some	conclusions	
	
The	main	difference	between	the	current	Quantitative	Easing	(QE)	activities	and	
the	QEHE	one	is	that	QE	activities	fund	debt	levels	of	either	the	U.S.	government	
or	government	related	entities.	The	effect	of	QE	is	that	it	postpones	the	day	that	
debt	 has	 to	 be	 collected	 from	 private	 households	 and	 companies.	 The	 main	
advantage	of	QEHE	 is	 that	 it	does	not	 rely	on	debt	market	 funding;	 it	 relies	on	
existing	 savings	 levels.	 The	 temporary	 monetization	 of	 some	 of	 such	 savings	
creates	a	cash	demand	for	goods	and	services,	with	as	beneficiary	the	household	
that	participates	in	the	scheme.	The	“re-saving”	after	a	period	of	time	brings	the	
savings	level	in	home	equity	back	to	previous	levels.	
	
Where	 as	 QEHE	 can	 be	 a	 scheme	 that,	 if	 widely	 accepted,	 it	 can	 potentially	
replace	U.S.	government	debt	creation.	The	household	will	be	at	the	center	of	the	
action,	not	the	government.	The	government	will	not	need	to	think	about	how	to	
spend	 the	 money	 in	 the	 first	 place;	 the	 individual	 households	 chose	 their	
spending	 level	 on	 basis	 of	 income	 level	 plus	 its	 home	 equity	 savings	 level.	
Repaying	 existing	 government	 debt	 levels	 can	 be	 spread	 out	 over	 a	 longer	
number	 of	 years,	 as	 the	 household	 sector	 becomes	 the	 new	 driver	 in	 the	
economic	adjustment	process.	
	
Managing	economic	growth	and	inflation	levels	as	well	as	the	shortening	of	the	
adjustment	periods	will	 all	 become	 realistic	 opportunities.	The	bottom	50%	of	
U.S.	households	deserves	it.	
	
Kees	De	Koning	
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Chorleywood,	U.K.	
9	March	2021	
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